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5  Rationality  and emotions  are  often considered as  polar  opposites:  Emotional  factors
cloud the transparency of  logic and intelligence,  while rational  factors are unable to
grasp emotional significance. When reasoning, people like to be considered as rational
beings that are able to deduce normatively valid and pragmatically adequate arguments
without  interference  from  emotions.  Nonetheless,  research  showed  that  emotional
factors  often  perturb  the  thinking  process:  Patients  suffering  from  phobia  or
hypochondria display a strong ‘emotion-biased’ reasoning that leads to the persistence of
their fears (De Jong, Haenen, Schmidt, & Mayer, 1998; de Jong, Mayer, & Van den hout,
1997).  There are some findings showing that  ‘mood’  or  affective state influences the
reasoning  style  (e.g.  Oaksford,  Morris,  Grainger,  &  Williams,  1996).  Relatively  little
research examined whether the affective valence of the content influences the reasoning
behaviour. In a recent paper Blanchette and Richards (2004) showed that people are less
likely  to  draw  logically  valid  inferences  when  reasoning  about  emotional  content.
However, they did not find an effect of positive versus negative emotional content. This
led them to conclude that ‘there might be something about processing emotional content […].
The  precise  mechanism through which  processing  emotional  content  affects  logical  reasoning
should  be  made  clear  by  future  research’  (p.  750).  In  this  article  we will  test  a  central
functional  mechanism  that  contributes  to  effects  of  emotional  content.  We  will
demonstrate that the simple emotional drift ‘don’t let anything bad happen’ gives rise to an
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avoidance  tendency  when  the  causal  conditionals  have  an  emotionally  aversive
consequent. The avoidance tendency is not present with positive or neutral content. This
kind of wishful thinking is a previously uninvestigated factor that provides an important
insight in how emotion interacts with the available background knowledge in influencing
the conditional inference process.  To investigate the effects of emotional factors while
controlling  for  effects  of  necessity  and  sufficiency,  we  will  use  a  specific  kind  of
conditionals, namely causal conditionals of the form ‘if cause, then effect’. 
6 We first discuss the principles of conditional reasoning; next we turn to the effect of
negative consequence valence. 
7  Drawing inferences from known ‘If cause, then effect’ relations is a paradigmatic case of
human inference making. The four traditional inferences from causal conditionals are: 
8 MP: Modus Ponens If cause, then effect. Cause, therefore effect. 
9 MT: Modus Tollens If cause, then effect. No effect, therefore no cause. 
10 AC: Affirmation of the Consequent If cause, then effect. Effect, therefore cause.
11 DA: Denial of the Antecedent If cause, then effect. No cause, therefore no effect.
12 Although normative theories consider the first two inferences as valid and the latter two
as fallacious, it is found that the inference acceptance rates do not follow this normative
criterion:  The  inference  acceptance  ratios  vary  according  to  the  information  that
reasoners  have  available  in  their  background knowledge  (Cummins,  1995;  Politzer  &
Bourmaud,  2002).  This  contextualization  process  is  characteristic  of  common-sense
reasoning  and  is  responsible  for  people’s  ability  to  adaptively  cope  with  everyday
situations.
13 There are two known factors that influence the inference acceptance rates. A first factor
is the number of available alternative causes and disabling conditions (Cummins, Alsknis,
Lubart & Rist, 1991). A disabling condition is a situation that prevents the effect from
occurring even when the cause is present. The effect of the number of available disablers
on MP (likewise for MT) can be illustrated with the following two sentences: 
14 - If you water a plant well, then it will stay green. 
15 - If butter is heated, then it will melt.
16 For sentence a people have many disablers available: deprivation of sunlight, disease, lack
of fertiliser, polluted water etc.  When reasoners think of at least one of these disablers
while solving an MP inference, they will not accept the default conclusion. Since there are
many disablers available, the probability of retrieving at least one is high, resulting in an
overall  low  MP  acceptance  ratio.   For  sentence  b,  people  have  only  few  disabling
conditions available. The probability of retrieving at least one disabler while reasoning
will be lower resulting in an overall high MP acceptance rate. Alternative causes have a
similar effect on AC (and DA) acceptance. Two sentences to illustrate: 
17 - If someone goes on a diet, then he will loose weight.
18 - If the light switch is flipped, then the light will go on. 
19 For sentence c  people can come up with many alternative causes:  sickness,  exercise,
stress, hard work etc. This results in a high probability that at least one alternative can be
retrieve during reasoning, yielding a low AC acceptance rate. For sentence d there are
only few alternative causes available. The probability of coming up with an alternative
cause during reasoning will  be considerably lower,  resulting in a high AC acceptance
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ratio.  Disabling  conditions  and  alternative  causes  are  jointly  referred  to  as
counterexamples.  The  effect  of  the  number  of  available  counterexamples  is  firmly
established (Cummins 1995;  Cummins et al.,  1991;  Thompson 1994;  1995;  2000) and is
taken into account by many –if not all- researchers investigating conditional reasoning
with everyday sentences. 
20 However, not all disablers and alternative causes are alike. A second factor showing the
robust effect of background knowledge on inference making is the strength of association
of  the  counterexamples.  Quinn  and  Markovits  (1998)  showed  that  the  inference
acceptance  rates  depend  on  the  association  strength  of  the  counterexamples.  For
sentences with an equal number of disablers it was found that when there is a strongly
associated available disabler MP acceptance rates are much lower than when disablers are
all weakly associated (Quinn & Markovits, 1998). An MP inference on the sentence: ‘If a
dog has skin disease, then it will scratch’ was overall less accepted than an MP inference
on the sentence:  ‘If  a dog has fleas,  then it  will  scratch’.  The association strength of
alternatives has a similar effect on AC and DA acceptance rates (De Neys, Schaeken, &
d’Ydewalle, 2003).  
21 Both  lines  of  research  emphasise  the  massive  impact  of  the  reasoners’  available
background  knowledge  on  their  reasoning  performance.  We  argue  that  this
counterexample availability can be mediated by emotional factors. This will be explained
in the following paragraph. 
22 Cognitive-affective  biases  have  been  investigated  in  social  cognition  (e.g.,  Marcus  &
Zajonc, 1986) but have long been neglected by researchers investigating the fundaments
of our everyday reasoning process. The current predictions are based on the positive-
negative asymmetry theory (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Taylor,
1991), of which Lewicka (1988, 1998) has demonstrated that it can account for human
deviations  from  normative  models  of  reasoning.  According  to  the  theory,  human
information processing bears the marks of a general tendency to have greater subjective
necessity  associated  with  avoiding  negative  outcomes  than  with  obtaining  positive
outcomes. In this way, Peeters (2002) found that associations elicited by negative word
stimuli (gangster) expressed more necessity (must be arrested) than associations elicited
by positive word stimuli did (e.g., friend: can be helpful). 
23 Because of the greater necessity associated with avoiding negative outcomes, participants
should attend more to conditions that may prevent expected negative events than to
conditions that may thwart expected positive events. Hence we predict that participants
in a conditional reasoning task will search more for disabling conditions when they are
reasoning from a sentence with a negative consequent than when they are reasoning
from a sentence with a positive consequent. Alternatively formulated: When there are
two  sentences  with  equally  sufficient  causes  and  one  with  a  neutral  or  positive
consequent  (e.g.  If  someone  gives  you  a  present,  then  you  are  happy.),  the  other  with a
negative consequent (e.g.  If  you sit  in the draft,  then you catch a cold.),  we expect that
reasoners will be less inclined to accept the MP argument for sentences with a negative
consequent compared to when the consequent is neutral or positive. This prediction will
be tested in the following experiment.  
24 The current experiment investigates whether disabler retrieval in causal reasoning is
triggered by the presence of negative effects. We will use a thinking-aloud setup in order
to closely monitor the use of disablers on MP inferences. We will also monitor the use of
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alternatives  in  AC  inferences,  but  there  are  no  specific  predictions  for  this  second
criterion. 
25 The sentences will  be divided in two groups depending on the rating of consequence
valence:  One group will  have a marked positive valence;  the other group will  have a
marked negative valence. Additionally, we will run a generation task in order to verify
whether  the  availability  of  counterexamples  is  comparable  for  both  the  positive
consequent and negative consequent‑  group. 
26 A total  of  86  students  of  the  University  of  Leuven (Psychology  and  Social  Sciences)
participated in this  study.  They were all  native  speakers  who participated in partial
fulfilment of  course requirements.  A first  group of  21 students rated the consequent
valence. A second group of 44 students rated first the co-occurrence of cause and effect,
and next they filled in the generation task: A total of 20 students rated the sufficiency of
the  cause  first,  then  they  generated  alternatives;  24  other  students  rated  first  the
necessity of the cause for the effect, then they generated disablers. A third group of 21
students participated in the reasoning task. 
27 Based on previous research (Verschueren, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2005a) we selected 16
sentences with either a positive (neutral) or negative consequent valence. To control for
effects of available background knowledge, we selected 4 sentences of each causal type:
(a) there were 4 sentences with a low-sufficient and low-necessary cause, (b) 4 sentences
with a low-sufficient and high-necessary cause, (c) 4 sentences with a high-sufficient and
low-necessary cause and  (d) 4 sentences with a high-sufficient and high-necessary cause.
The level of sufficiency and necessity was tested by asking participants to rate how often
the effect followed the cause (sufficiency), and how often the cause preceded the effect
(necessity) (Thompson, 2000; Verschueren, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2005b). Participants
answered by circling one out of five answer options: never, seldom, sometimes, often or
always (coded 1 to 5), they rated either the sufficiency of all sentences or the necessity of
all sentences. Table 1 provides an overview of the 16 sentences and their mean rating of P
(q|p) – indicator of sufficiency- and P(p|q) –indicator of necessity of the cause.
28 Table 1.  List  of  sentences used in Experiment 1 including their mean sufficiency and
necessity rating. 
Sentence   
If you are insulted, then you get angry. 2,4* 4,875
If you call someone, then his phone rings. 3,06* 3
If you cut your finger, then your finger will bleed. 3,11* 3,75
If a girl is pretty, then boys fall in love with her. 3,3* 3,625
If you drink too little water, then you get a headache. 3,45* 2,375*
If you unplug the cable, then the computer shuts down. 3,6* 3*
If you drink coffee during the evening, then it takes longer to fall asleep. 3,75* 2,375*
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If someone gives you a present, then you are happy. 3,75* 2,5*
If you have a high income, then you are rich. 3,85 4,125
If you sit in the draft, then you catch a cold. 3,95 2,625*
If the road is slippery, then there are car accidents. 4,05 3
If you call someone, then his phone rings. 4,3 4,5
If you sit in the sun, then you get tanned. 4,8 3,125*
If you eat lots of candy, then you get cavities. 4,8 3,375
If you water a plant regularly, then it will stay green. 4,8 4,125
If you jump in a pool filled with water, then you get wet. 4,9 2,75*
29 Note: Ratings below average are indicated by *.
30 The participants were presented with the 16 sentences and asked to judge the valence of
the consequent on a 5-point scale: (1) very negative, (2) slightly  negative, (3) indifferent,
(4) slightly positive, (5) very positive. Every participant rated all sixteen sentences, the
presentation  order  of  the  sentences  was  counterbalanced.  The  rating  task  was
administered collectively. The instructions can be found in the Appendix.
31 The generation task was the same as the one used by Cummins et al. (1991), Cummins
(1995) and Verschueren et al.(2004). 
32 For generating disablers, the task looks as follows: 
33 - Rule: If a plant is well watered, then it will stay green. 
34 - Fact: A plant is well watered but it does NOT stay green. 
35 List as many explanations for this situation as possible. 
36 For generating alternatives:
37 - Rule: If a plant is well watered, then it will stay green. 
38 - Fact: A plant stays green but it is NOT well watered. 
39 List as many explanations for this situation as possible. 
40 Participants were asked to write down as many explanations for the given scenario as
possible. It was explicitly mentioned that variants to previously given answers would not
be scored, nor will answers that refer to fantasy stories. The participants were given 15 to
20 minutes to generate either disablers or alternatives for all 16 sentences. 
41 The reasoners  were  tested individually.  Each reasoning problem was  presented on a
different sheet. An example of an MP problem: 
42 - If you cut your finger, then your finger will bleed. 
43 - Some cuts his finger. 
44 - Will his finger bleed or not? 
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45 Participants read the problem aloud and were asked to give whatever information they
considered relevant to answer the question in an everyday setting. Their answers were
recorded on audiotape. Reasoners were free to elaborate or revise their conclusions on-
line and leafed through the pages in a self-paced manner. It took participants about 15
minutes to complete the task. All 16 sentences occurred in MP as well as in AC format.
The resulting 32 reasoning problems were blocked by inference type: The inference order
was  counterbalanced,  with  a  short  break  after  the  first  block  of  16  inferences.
 Participants were asked to clear their mind and to reason in the second block as though
they just started the experiment.  
46 Based on the results of  the rating task we divided the sentences in a positive and a
negative valence group. The average rating for the 8 sentences of the negative-valence
group was 1.67 (SD = .28, Range [1.24, 1.95]), the average rating for the 8 sentences of the
positive-valence group was 3.79 (SD = .67, Range [3.05, 4.95]).  The valence rating for the
two groups of  sentences was clearly distinct,  t(14) = -8,27,  p <  .001.  One group has a
marked positive mean consequence valence, the other group has a marked negative mean
valence. There was no significant correlation between the disabler generation results and
the alternative generation results, Spearman R = .04, N = 16. 
47 Based on the generation task results,  we checked whether  both groups of  sentences
differed in the number of available counterexamples. There was no significant difference
in the number 
48 Based on the generation task results,  we checked whether  both groups of  sentences
differed in the number of available counterexamples. There was no significant difference
in the number of available disabling conditions (Mpos = 1.99, Mneg = 2.09), nor in the
number  of  available  alternative  causes  ((Mpos  =  3.0,  Mneg  =  2.62).  We  replicate  the
findings of Verschueren et al. (2004) that there are overall less disablers generated than
alternative causes, t(15) = -3.78, p  < .01 (Mdis = 2.04, Malt = 2.82). 
49 The  reasoning  data  were  scored  by  two  independent  raters.  For  each  trial  it  was
determined whether the answer referred to a counterexample, if this was the case it was
noted how many counterexamples the reasoner mentioned. For trials where reasoners
did not mention a counterexample, raters indicated whether the reasoner accepted the
inference or referred to a likelihood or probability estimate. The sentence codes were
removed  during  coding.  In  the  first  rating  phase  there  were  9.03%  discordances
(excluding the number of counterexamples).  We created a subset with the discording
sentences, removed all codings from the first phase and asked the two (still independent)
raters to attentively rescore the selected items. After this second rating phase there were
 2.78% discordances (on a total of 288 trials). Next, the raters reached an agreement on
the discording trials. The interrater linear correlation on the number of counterexamples
was  .84  (288 trials).  For  the  analysis  we  used  the  average  of  the  number  of
counterexamples. For each sentence we summed the number of acceptance answers as
well as the number of times reasoners mentioned counterexamples.
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50 Figure 1. Total number of MP acceptance and counterexample responses for sentences
with a negative or a positive consequent.
51 We ran an ANOVA with consequence valence as categorical predictor (between sentence)
and the type of response (acceptance, counterexample use or reference to probability or
likelihood  information)  as  dependent  variable.  There  was  a  significant  interaction
between the consequence valence and the type of answer, F(2, 28) = 4,6832, p < .05. Figure
1 displays the observed means. There were more inferences accepted for sentences with a
positive consequent than for sentences with a negative consequent, F(1, 14) = 4.89, MSE =
16.64,  p  <  .05 (Mpos= 5.18,  Mneg= 2).  There were less counterexamples used when the
consequent is neutral to positive, F(1, 14) = 5.39, MSE = 15.08, p < .05 (Mpos= 11.44, Mneg=
14.6). There was no significant difference in the use of likelihood information. 
52 In order to get a firm grasp at the current data, we ran four additional ANOVA’s. Two for
MP  and  two  for  AC,  each  considering  sentences  with  either  many  available
counterexamples  (disablers  and  alternatives  respectively)  or  few  available
counterexamples. In the previous analysis the number of available counterexamples was
not taken into account, although it can yield a mass variation that is orthogonal to the
effect of our key variable. 
53 For the few-disabler set, the results were in the right direction, but non-significant (note
the large within group variation).  For the many-disablers set,  there was a marginally
significant interaction between consequence valence and answer type, F(2, 12) = 3.28, p =
.07: When there is a negative consequent there are less inferences accepted, F(1,6) = 4.37,
MSE = 3.45, p = .08, and more counterexamples used, F(1,6) = 4.76, MSE = 2.13, p = .07. There
was no difference in the use of likelihood information. Figure 2 displays the means for
both groups of sentences. 
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54      a) few disablers
55 b) many disablers
56 Figure 2. Total number of MP acceptance and counterexample responses by consequent
valence (negative/positive) and number of available counterexamples (few/many).  
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57 For the few-alternatives group, there was a significant interaction between consequence
valence and answer type, F(1,  2) =11.92,   p < .001:  There are markedly less inferences
accepted for sentences with a negative effect F(1,6) = 10.17, MSE =  12.5, p <.05, and more
counterexamples mentioned F(1, 6) = 17.10, MSE = 7.96, p <.001. There were no differences
in  use  of  likelihood  information.  For  the  many-alternatives  group,  the  interaction
consequence valence answer type returned non-significant.  Both interaction effects on
AC are illustrated in Figure 3.
 a)
Few Alternatives
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b)
Many Alternatives
58 Figure 3. Total number of MP acceptance and counterexample responses by consequent
valence (negative/positive) and number of available counterexamples (few/many).
59 The results were in line with the expectations. In case reasoners have many disablers
available,  they  eagerly  mention  these  counterexamples  when  the  conditional  has  a
negative consequent.  This effect can be read as a cognitive simulation of prevention.
Reasoners can be considered as emotionally driven to prevent negative effects, yielding a
much more prevalent activation of the situations that might lead to prevention. When
there are only few counterexamples available, the results were in the expected direction,
but failed to reach significance.  The smaller effect of consequence valence on sentences
with few disablers might reflect an insufficient availability of disabling effects. Although
people can still come up with disablers for these sentences when they are given a disabler
generation task, the additional cognitive demands associated with a reasoning task, may
increase the retrieval threshold for these disablers (see Verschueren, De Neys, Schaeken,
& d’Ydewalle, 2004). 
60 We also found significant effects of consequence valence on AC. Similar as on MP, we
found  that  reasoners  are  more  inclined  to  accept  inferences  that  have  a  positive
consequent, whereas for sentences with a negative consequent, reasoners retrieve more
alternative causes.  The retrieval of extra causes for negative effects could be seen as
somewhat in contrast with the idea of mere mentally avoiding negative effects, indeed,
but it  is in line with the idea of controlling negative effects by getting grip on their
possible causes. In agreement with this explanation, Peeters and Czapinski (1990) have
reviewed evidence that negative stimuli elicit more "why" questions than positive stimuli
do and that this "informational negativity effect" may reduce straightforward avoidance
reactions. Alternatively, we can consider the retrieval of causes for negative effects as an
epiphenomenon of the effect of increased disabler-retrieval. According to the paper of
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Markovits and Barrouillet (2002) disabler retrieval is often secondary to the retrieval of
alternatives.  It  is  thus  possible  that  the  mere  presentation  of  a  conditional  with  a
negative  effect  triggers  the  cognitive  reaction  of  disabler  retrieval,  which  is  partly
mediated or at least correlated with alternative retrieval (see also De Neys, Schaeken, &
d’Ydewalle,  2002,  for  comments  on  the  interplay  between  disabler  and  alternative
retrieval processes). Further research may differentiate between these two hypotheses. 
61 Although reason and emotion are often seen as mutually exclusive concepts, emotional
factors can penetrate the reasoning process in a very subtle yet influential  way.  The
current experiment shows that even plain, non-intrusive conditional inference patterns
change depending on whether people reason about a positive or negative consequent.
Nonetheless, replication and variation studies are mandatory in order to firmly establish
this positive-negative effect on conditional reasoning. We make the following suggestions
for further research:  (a)  Limit  the sentence selection to conditionals with average to
many counterexamples. (b) Carefully check the pragmatic type of the sentences. Some of
the sentences we used can be understood as warnings. Using temporals or strict physical
themata may purify the results (avoid mentioning ‘you’ in the antecedent and consequent
terms). (c) Check the effect with more controlled, abstract material.
62 This  currently  observed  effect  of  consequence  valence  on  conditional  reasoning,
contributes  an  important  insight  to  the  effects  of  pragmatic  content  on  inference
acceptance  rates.  Newstead,  Ellis,  Evans  &  Dennis  (1997)  found  that  people  reason
differently with conditional promises and tips, which both have a positive consequent,
than with threats and warnings,  which both have a negative consequent.  Verbrugge,
Dieussaert,  Schaeken  &  Van  Belle  (2004)  explained  this  difference  in  terms  of
illocutionary effects.  We argue that the valence of  the consequent by itself  may also
contribute to the observed differences. 
63 Although  social  cognition  and  reasoning  research  both  concern  processes  of  higher
cognition, their domains of research and insights often co-exist next to one another. The
current study shows that insights from social cognition can further reasoning research. A
more thorough crosspollination between social cognition and reasoning research might
lead to fruitful progressions in both domains. 
64 This  work  was  carried  out  thanks  to  the  support  of  the  Leuven  Research  Council
(Leuvense Onderzoeksraad). Joost De Cock is thanked for co-rating the protocol answers.
65 Mensen gebruiken vaak ‘als oorzaak- dan effect’ zinnen in de dagdagelijkse omgang. De
affectieve geladenheid van een effect bepaalt welke afleidingen er worden gemaakt. Om
het onderzoek naar dit principe te kunnen starten willen we weten welke effecten door
jou  als  negatief,  neutraal  of  positief  worden  beleefd.  Je  zal  worden  gevraagd  de
geladenheid van een reeks effecten te beoordelen. In welke mate een effect ‘negatief’ is
kan je beschouwen als de mate waarin mensen willen dat het effect niet optreedt. Voor
elk effect duid je het bolletje aan van het antwoord dat aangeeft hoe jij het effect ervaart. 
66 People  often  use  ‘if  cause,  then  effect’  sentences  in  everyday  life.  The  emotional
connotation  of  the  effect  influences  how  people  reason.  Researchers  are  currently
investigating this effect. In order to perform the investigation we need to know whether
you consider certain effects as negative, positive or neutral. You will be given a list of
sentences and asked to judge the valence of the stated effect. How ‘negative’ an effect is
can be inferred from the extent that people do not want the effect to occur. For each
sentence you mark the answer alternative that corresponds to your judgment. 
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67 1.  Als je 's avonds koffie drinkt, dan duurt het langer voordat je inslaapt. 
68 2. Als je een kadootje krijgt, dan ben je blij.
69 3. Als je in de tocht zit, dan word je verkouden.
70 4. Als je in je vinger snijdt, dan begint de vinger te bloeden.
71 5. Als je in de zon zit, dan word je bruin.
72 6. Als een meisje mooi is, dan worden jongens op haar verliefd.
73 7. Als je te weinig drinkt, dan krijg je hoofdpijn.
74 8. Als je een plant regelmatig water geeft, blijft hij groen.
75 9. Als je veel snoept, dan krijg je gaatjes in je tanden.
76 10. Als er op een gong geslagen wordt, dan maakt de gong geluid.
77 11. Als je de stekker uittrekt, dan valt de computer uit.
78 12. Als je in een zwembad vol water springt, dan word je nat.
79 13. Als je wordt beledigd, dan word je kwaad.
80 14. Als iemand wordt opgebeld, dan rinkelt zijn telefoon.
81 15. Als het wegdek glad is, dan gebeuren er auto-ongelukken.
82 16 Als je veel geld verdient, dan ben je rijk.
83 1. If you drink coffee during the evening, then it takes longer to fall asleep. [N]
84 2. If someone gives you a present, then you are happy.    -
85 3. If you sit in the draft, then you catch a cold.   [N]
86 4. If you cut your finger, then your finger will bleed.   [N]
87 5. If you sit in the sun, then you get tanned.    - 
88 6. If a girl is pretty, then boys fall in love with her.    - 
89 7. If you drink too little water, then you get a headache.   [N]
90 8. If you water a plant regularly, then it will stay green.    -
91 9. If you eat lots of candy, then you get cavities.   [N]
92 10. If a gong is hit, then it sounds.      -
93 11. If you unplug the cable, then the computer shuts down.   [N]
94 12. If you jump in a pool filled with water, then you get wet.               -
95 13. If you are insulted, then you get angry.   [N]
96 14. If you call someone, then his phone rings.    -
97 15. If the road is slippery, then there are car accidents.   [N]
98 16.  If you have a high income, then you are rich.    -
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ABSTRACTS
Considerable evidence showed that there are two factors that influence the inference acceptance
rates on conditional inferences: the number of available counterexamples and their strength of
association. Inspired by the negativity effect, we propose that a third factor, the valence of the
conditional terms, sorts an additional effect on the acceptance rates. The reported experiment
shows  that  –when  controlling  for  counterexample  availability-  the  use  of  counterexample
information is mediated by the perceived negativity of the conditional consequent. 
De  nombreux  resultats  ont  montré  qu’il  y  avait  deux  facteurs  qui  influencent  les  taux
d’acceptation d’une inférence quand il s’agit d’inférences conditionnelles: le nombre de contre-
exemples disponibles et la force de leur association. En prenant en compte l’effet de négativité,
nous faisons l’hypothèse qu’un troisième facteur, la valence des termes conditionnels, joue sur
les taux d’acceptation. Notre expérience montre que l’utilisation de l’information contenue dans
ces  contre-exemples,  dont  nous  contrôlons  la  disponibilité,  est  médiatisée  par la  négativité
perçue de la conditionnel consécutive.
INDEX
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